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The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”1 It 
is widely understood that the First Amendment’s core purpose is to 
protect political speech from governmental suppression.2 Yet, the First 
Amendment’s text does not indicate that its protections apply only to 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., May 2012, Indiana University, Bloomington.  
1 U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment is applicable to the States via the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., et al., 507 U.S. 410, 412 n.1 (1993) (internal citations omitted).   
2 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“The First 
Amendment reflects a ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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certain kinds of speech.3 Thus, individuals have sought to apply the 
First Amendment’s protection to other forms of speech, including 
speech that is commercial in nature.  
Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply the First 
Amendment’s protections to commercial speech, but, in 1976, the 
Court granted commercial speech a limited degree of First 
Amendment protection.4 However, since then the Court has struggled 
to define the distinction between commercial speech and speech that is 
fully protected by the First Amendment.5 The Court often avoids the 
issue, alluding to the “commonsense distinctions” between 
commercial speech and “other varieties,” without any explanation of 
what qualifies as a “commonsense distinction.”6   
In early 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
addressed the distinction between commercial speech and 
noncommercial speech in the context of a private law dispute.7 In 
2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held 
that a supermarket’s one-page tribute to Michael Jordan on his 
Basketball Hall of Fame induction in a special edition issue of Sports 
Illustrated was noncommercial speech that was fully protected by the 
First Amendment.8 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit unanimously 
reversed the district court’s decision.9 The Seventh Circuit considered 
the entire context surrounding the supermarket’s one-page tribute to 
Jordan, and the court held that it was a form of image advertising 
linked to Jordan for the primary purpose of promoting the 
                                                 
3 Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 
Va. L. Rev. 627, 631 (1990) (“nothing in the text of the First Amendment creates a 
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.”). 
4 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council (Va. 
Pharmacy), 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
5 See Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 419 (acknowledging “the difficulty of drawing 
bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category”).   
6 E.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995).  
7 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
8 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (N.D. Ill., 
2012). 
9 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 512.  
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supermarket’s brand.10 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held the 
supermarket’s ad was commercial speech.11       
Part I of this comment provides a summary of the commercial 
speech doctrine from its inception to the present. Part II explains the 
difficulty of applying the commercial speech doctrine in the context of 
a private-law dispute and examines other court’s differing applications 
of the commercial speech doctrine in similar cases. Part III reviews the 
factual and procedural context of Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., as 
well as the district court’s and Seventh Circuit’s holdings. Finally, part 
IV analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, and argues that the 
Seventh Circuit’s flexible application of the commercial speech 
doctrine is the best path forward in private-law commercial speech 
cases.  
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
A. The Old Rule: No Protection for Commercial Speech 
 
 Although the First Amendment was ratified in 1792, it was not 
until 1942 that an individual claimed constitutional protection for a 
commercial expression.12 In Valentine v. Christensen, the respondent 
charged customers a fee to view the submarine he displayed in New 
York City’s State pier.13 The respondent attempted to distribute 
handbills advertising the fee to see his submarine in the city streets, 
but such commercial advertising was prohibited under the city’s 
sanitary code.14 However, the city informed respondent that he could 
distribute his handbills in the streets as long as they concerned 
“information or a public protest.”15 In response, respondent created a 
double-sided handbill; one side contained the original advertisement 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) 
13 Id. at 52-53. 
14 Id. at 53. 
15 Id. 
3
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without reference to the fee, and the other side protested the city’s 
prohibition on his use of city facilities to display his submarine.16 
Respondent distributed the double-sided handbill and was cited by the 
police.17 He alleged the city’s restriction of his commercial advertising 
violated his First Amendment guarantee to free speech.18  
The U.S. Supreme Court denied respondent’s challenge, finding it 
was “clear the Constitution impose[d] no such restraint on government 
as [it] respects purely commercial advertising.”19 The Court 
determined that respondent’s distribution of his handbill was not an 
exercise of his First Amendment freedoms because he merely added 
the protest of the city’s decision to his handbill solely to evade 
compliance with the ordinance.20  Thus, without citing any precedent, 
the Court held that commercial speech did not receive any First 
Amendment protection from governmental regulation.21 However, the 
Court quickly began to question its decision’s validity.22    
 
B. The Valentine Rule’s Erosion 
 
Over the next several decades the “‘commercial speech’ exception 
to the First Amendment” created in Valentine began to erode.23 In 
1959, Justice Douglas, a member of the Valentine Court’s unanimous 
decision, stated that the Valentine “ruling was casual, almost offhand. 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 54. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id.; see also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 628 (stating that the 
Valentine decision “cites no authority”).  
22 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 n.6 (1975) (citing Lehman v. 
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“There is some doubt concerning the ‘commercial speech’ distinction announced in 
Valentine v. Christensen . . . retains continuing validity.”). 
23 Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977). 
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And it has not survived reflection.”24 Only five years later, the 
Supreme Court found a newspaper advertisement both criticizing 
police action and seeking contributions to the civil rights movement 
was entitled to the “same degree of protection as ordinary speech.”25  
In the following decade the U.S. Supreme Court again rejected the 
idea that commercial speech was outside the purview of First 
Amendment protections.26 In Pittsburgh Press Company v. The 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, the Supreme Court noted 
that newspaper employment advertisements were “classic examples of 
commercial speech.”27 However, the Court sustained a governmental 
regulation prohibiting newspapers from segregating between jobs 
requesting male and female applicants because the advertisement’s 
commercial proposals were themselves illegal.28 Thus, the Court 
upheld the regulation because the advertisements were illegal, not 
because commercial speech itself was unworthy of constitutional 
protection.29  
Only two years after Pittsburgh Press, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bigelow v. Virginia reaffirmed that the Valentine Court’s “holding 
[was] a distinctly limited one.”30 In Bigelow, the appellant was 
convicted under a state statute that prohibited the publication of 
information that could encourage abortions.31 The appellant argued 
that the state statute violated his First Amendment right to free 
speech.32 The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Valentine, 
                                                 
24 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 820 n.6 (1975) (citing Cammarano v. United States, 
358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J. concurring)). 
25 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 820 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
266 (1964)). 
26 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. The Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rel. Comm’n, 
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).  
27 Id.  
28Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385).  
29 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 821 (“The illegality of the activity was particularly 
stressed.”) 
30 Id. at 819. 
31 Id. at 811. 
32 Id. 
5
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noting that the Valentine ordinance “was upheld as a reasonable 
regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be 
distributed.”33 The Court further stated that Valentine obviously does 
not stand “for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial 
advertising are immune from constitutional challenge.”34  
Moreover, the Bigelow Court stressed that its decision in Pittsburg 
Press reaffirmed the principle “that commercial advertising enjoys a 
degree of First Amendment Protection.”35 The Bigelow Court held that 
appellant’s advertisement “did more than simply propose a 
commercial transaction” because it “contained factual material of clear 
public interest.” 36 Thus, the Court concluded that appellant’s 
advertisement was not “stripped of all First Amendment protection.”37 
Consequently, after Bigelow, “the notion of unprotected ‘commercial 
speech’ all but passed from the scene.”38 One year after Bigelow, the 
Supreme Court explicitly overruled its Valentine decision.39  
 
C. The Birth of Modern Commercial Speech Doctrine 
 
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council established what is 
now known as modern commercial speech doctrine.40 In Virginia 
Pharmacy, the appellees challenged a Virginia statute that prohibited 
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.41 The Supreme 
Court bluntly stated the issue was “whether there [was] a First 
                                                 
33 Id. at 819. 
34 Id. at 819-20. 
35 Id. at 821. 
36 Id. at 822. 
37 Id. 
38 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council (Va. 
Pharmacy), 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976). 
39 Id. at 760-61. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 749-50. 
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Amendment exception for ‘commercial speech.’”42 The Court held 
that information conveyed through commercial speech serves the First 
Amendment goals of smart and informed public decision making.43 
Thus, the Virginia Pharmacy Court held that commercial speech was 
entitled to constitutional protection.44 However, the Supreme Court 
noted that commercial speech only received a “degree” of First 
Amendment protection.45   
 
D. Why The Supreme Court Deemed Commercial Speech Worthy 
of Constitutional Protection 
 
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court held that although 
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, it 
could still be reasonably regulated by the state.46 The Virginia 
Pharmacy Court offered several policy rationales for its grant of 
limited First Amendment protection for commercial speech.47 Since 
Virginia Pharmacy the Supreme Court has on occasion elaborated and 
expanded on these rationales.48  
 
1. Why Grant Commercial Speech First Amendment Protection 
At All? 
 
 The Supreme Court found commercial speech receives First 
Amendment protection because it contributes to the free flow of 
information, which is at the heart of the First Amendment.49 The 
                                                 
42 Id. at 760-61. 
43 Id. at 765. 
44 Id. at 771 n.24. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 770. 
47 Id. at 771 n.24. 
48 E.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).  
49 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council (Va. 
Pharmacy), 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); see, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 
1215 (2011). 
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Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy phrased the question of First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech in this way: whether a 
commercial advertisement “is so removed from any ‘exposition of 
ideas,’ and from ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its 
diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,’ 
that it lacks all protection.”50 The Court noted that, to a consumer in 
need of affordable medication, prescription drug prices might be more 
important than the “day’s most urgent political debate.”51 Thus, as the 
Supreme Court stated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
Supreme Court, “the extension of First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech is justified principally by the value” of the 
information it provides to individual consumers.52 
Moreover, in addition to the individual consumer, the Virginia 
Pharmacy Court found that society as a whole also has a strong 
interest in the free flow of commercial information.53 The Court noted 
that entirely commercial expressions might be of general public 
interest, such as advertisements for legal abortion services or 
advertisements for businesses that produce products in the United 
States instead of abroad.54 Accordingly, commercial expression 
receives First Amendment protection because it “furthers the societal 
interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information.”55  
Finally, the Virginia Pharmacy Court observed that because the 
allocation of resources in a free enterprise economy is made through 
the aggregate of individual economic decisions, it is a matter of public 
interest that those decisions be “intelligent and well informed.”56 Thus, 
the Court determined the free flow of commercial information was 
                                                 
50 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. 
51 Id. at 763. 
52 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985).  
53 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764. 
54 Id.  
55 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 561-62 (1980). 
56 Va Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. 
8
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indispensable to “the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise 
economy.”57 The Virginia Pharmacy Court further noted that the free 
flow of commercial speech was indispensable to the formation of 
intelligent opinions about how the economy “ought to be regulated or 
altered.”58 Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned that the free flow of 
commercial information indirectly served the First Amendment 
interest of “enlighten[ing] public decision making.”59 Thus, 
commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection because 
it “performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a 
free enterprise system” by informing the public “of the availability, 
nature, and prices of products and services.”60   
 
2. Why Protect Commercial Speech Less Than Expressive 
Speech? 
 
While the First Amendment’s protections do apply to commercial 
speech, those protections are less extensive than those afforded to 
other forms of expression because governments retain the right to 
ensure that the flow of commercial information is “truthful and 
legitimate.”61 The Supreme Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
reasoned that commercial speech content may be regulated because 
consumer consumption of false or misleading commercial information 
would actually run counter to “the individual and societal interests . . . 
in facilitating ‘informed and reliable decision making.’”62 Thus, 
“content-based restrictions on commercial speech” are permissible 




60 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., et al., 507 U.S. 410, 412 n.17 
(1993) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)). 
61 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
62 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978) (citing Bates, 
433 U.S. at 364.) 
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because of the “greater potential for deception or confusion” in 
advertising.63  
Specifically, the Virginia Pharmacy Court determined that 
regulation of commercial speech was constitutionally permissible for 
two reasons. First, the Supreme Court explained that some content-
based regulation of commercial speech to protect consumers was 
permissible because the truth of commercial speech is “more easily 
verifiable by its disseminator.”64 The Court determined that an 
advertiser’s claims about his own specific product or service are more 
easily verifiable because the truth of his claims are subject to greater 
objectivity than, for instance, a politician’s comments on politics or a 
reporter’s version of the news.65 Therefore, the Virginia Pharmacy 
Court reasoned that it is unlikely that a government prohibition on 
deceptive advertising would chill commercial speech because 
advertisers possess the requisite information about their products and 
services to be sure that their claims are truthful.66 As a result, 
commercial speech receives a lesser degree of First Amendment 
protection than “other constitutionally safeguarded forms of 
expression.”67   
Second, the Virginia Pharmacy Court further held that 
commercial speech regulation was appropriate because it is “more 
durable than other kinds” of speech.68 The Supreme Court reasoned 
that because commercial advertising is instrumental to profits “there is 
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation.”69 
Accordingly, commercial speech receives less constitutional protection 
than other forms of speech because advertising’s importance to profits 
makes it less likely “to be inhibited by proper regulation.”70  
                                                 
63 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). 
64 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64-65. 
68 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
69 Id. 
70 Rogers v. Friedman, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). 
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Lastly, the Supreme Court granted commercial speech less First 
Amendment protection than noncommercial speech out of fear that 
offering commercial speech equal protection will dilute the strength of 
the First Amendment as a whole.71 In Ohralik, the Supreme Court 
noted that commercial speech “occurs in an area traditionally subject 
to government regulation,” and thus warned that a requirement of 
equal constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial 
speech “could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the 
force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to” noncommercial 
speech.72 Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that because 
commercial speech weighed less “on the scale of First Amendment 
values,” it was safer to grant commercial speech a “limited measure” 
of constitutional protection rather than potentially “subject the First 
Amendment to such a devitalization.”73  
 
E. From Virginia Pharmacy to the Present: The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Struggle to Define the Distinction Between  
Commercial Speech and Noncommercial Speech 
 
The Virginia Pharmacy Court’s grant of limited First Amendment 
protection fostered a new doctrine of free speech jurisprudence; 
however, that doctrine is chaotic.74 The U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the contours of commercial speech are difficult to 
delineate, and often the Court avoids the issues and merely assumes 
the challenged speech is commercial speech.75 In fact, the Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to clarify the commercial speech doctrine, 
but punted instead by dismissing a writ of certiorari as improvidently 
                                                 
71 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
72 Id.  
73 Id. 
74 See Kathryn E. Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy 
Center Regulations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 591, 
596 (2013) (“Commercial Speech doctrine is a mess.”) 
75 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., et al., 507 U.S. 410, 419, 424 
(1993). 
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granted.76 Not surprisingly, judges and scholars disagree as to the 
commercial speech doctrine’s proper interpretation and application.77 
Thus, the commercial speech doctrine remains open to interpretation.78 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court’s convoluted precedents 
offer several methods to determine whether an expression constitutes 
“commercial speech.”79 These methods outline a spectrum that 
demonstrates the degree to which an expression is “commercial,” i.e. 
whether speech is purely commercial, sufficiently commercial, or 
noncommercial.80 The Supreme Court created roughly four different 
methods to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial 
speech for First Amendment purposes.81 These methods can be 
characterized as (1) the “core” or “pure” commercial speech test, (2) 
the “expanded core” commercial speech test, (3) the “Bolger 
framework” for mixed speech, and (4) the “inextricably intertwined” 
exception.82 These methods build on one another; most courts start 
with the “core” or “pure” commercial speech test and then, if not 
satisfied, move on to another.83 The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to 
author a uniform commercial speech test makes it difficult to draw the 
                                                 
76 See Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage 
in Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 379, 381-82 (2006) (citing Nike v. 
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003). 
77 See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 596. 
78 Id. 
79 See Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 422-23.  
80 See id.; see also Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474-475 (1989). 
81 See Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 422-23; see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 474-475. 
82 See Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 422-423; see generally Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council (Va. Pharmacy), 425 U.S. 748, 759 
(1976); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Fox, 492 U.S. 
469.  
83 See, e.g., Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 517-522 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
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bright lines necessary to properly distinguish commercial speech from 
noncommercial speech.84 
 
1. The “Core” or “Pure” Commercial Speech Test  
 
In Virginia Pharmacy, the U.S. Supreme Court defined 
commercial speech as “speech which does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.” Notably, the Virginia Pharmacy Court first 
framed the issue generally as whether an advertisement proposing to 
sell “X prescription drug at the Y price . . . [was] wholly outside” the 
First Amendment’s protections.85 However, the Court then refined and 
restated the issue as “whether speech which does ‘no more than 
propose a commercial transaction’” receives any First Amendment 
protection.86 The Virginia Pharmacy Court held that commercial 
speech is entitled to a degree of constitutional protection, and thus 
affirmatively declared that speech “which does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction” constitutes commercial speech.87 Yet, the 
Court left several important questions unanswered.   
The Virginia Pharmacy Court did not elaborate on whether it was 
a necessary or merely sufficient condition of commercial speech that it 
“do no more than propose a commercial transaction.”88 In other words, 
it was unclear whether speech that communicated information 
unrelated to the proposal of a commercial transaction, but nonetheless 
indirectly proposed a commercial transaction, could constitute 
commercial speech for First Amendment purposes.89 However, while 
                                                 
84 See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 596 (Describing wildly different commercial 
speech doctrine interpretations and applications because “the Court has never 
articulated a singular definition, test, or set of tests for what commercial speech is.”). 
85 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. 
86 Id. at 762.  
87 Id. at 771 n.24; see, e.g., Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 421 (“We held that even 
speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is protected by the 
First Amendment.”).  
88 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24  
89 See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 598-99 (Describing lower court disagreements 
over the necessary conditions for classifying expression as commercial speech). 
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it was unclear if the latter could be characterized as commercial 
speech, there was no question that the former qualified as commercial 
speech.90  
Moreover, the Virginia Pharmacy Court indicated that an 
advertisement offering “X prescription drug at the Y price,” was a 
prime example of speech that “did no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.”91 Consequently, courts regards speech that solely and 
explicitly communicates the fundamental components necessary to a 
commercial transaction, such as price and product, as “the core 
notions” of commercial speech, or as “pure” commercial speech.92  
In addition to explicit references of product price, the Supreme 
Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products. Corp. held that speech 
explicitly communicating information regarding a product’s 
availability, quality, or quantity constitutes core commercial speech. 93 
Similarly, the Pittsburgh Press Court described offers to buy and sell 
employment services as “classic examples of commercial speech.”94 
Moreover, the Ohralik Court held a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of a 
prospective client was an “[e]xpression concerning [a] purely 
commercial transaction.”95 In all of these aforementioned cases, the 
Court found the advertisements were “pure” commercial speech 
because in each case the advertisements conveyed information that 
“did no more than propose a commercial transaction.”96 
While the Supreme Court has identified explicit and direct 
expressions that communicate only the fundamental components 
necessary to a commercial transaction as “pure” commercial speech, 
                                                 
90 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
91 Id. at 761-62. 
92 E.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
93 Id. at 62-63 (finding that a “multi-page, multi-item flyers promoting a large 
variety of products available at a drug store” fell “within the core notion of 
commercial speech”).  
94 Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385 (describing help-wanted advertisements as 
“no more than a proposal of possible employment”). 
95 Ohralik, 436, U.S. at 455-57. 
96 See generally Bolger, 463 U.S. at 62-63; Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385; 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-57 (1978). 
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the Court has also found implicit and indirect commercial expressions 
to be “core” commercial speech. The Supreme Court in Friedman v. 
Rogers, held an optometry practice’s use of a trade name was “part of 
a proposal of a commercial transaction” because the trade name 
implicitly conveyed information about the prices and services the 
practice offered.97 Similarly, in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro 
Tp., the Court held a homeowner’s display of “for sale” and “sold” 
signs was indirect speech that “did no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.”98 
However, in other cases the Supreme Court drew a narrower 
scope of “pure” commercial speech. In Village of Schaumburg v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court held that charitable 
solicitations were not “a variety of purely commercial speech” because 
they “did more than inform private economic decisions” and were “not 
primarily concerned with providing information about the . . . costs of 
goods and services.”99 Similarly, in Glickman v. Wileman Bros & 
Elliot, Inc., Justice Souter, in dissent, stated that a California fruit 
campaign’s use of symbolic and emotional techniques to convey 
messages far removed from proposals to sell fruit “went well beyond 
the ideal type of pure commercial speech . . . [that did] ‘no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.’”100 Accordingly, speech containing 
elements beyond those necessary to propose a commercial transaction 
is not considered “pure” commercial speech.   
The “core” or “pure” commercial speech analysis is conducted 
first because it is the most easily discernable form of commercial 
expression.101 Thus, if a court finds the challenged speech falls within 
                                                 
97 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1979). 
98 Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977). 
99 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 440 U.S. 620, 632 
(1980). 
100 Glickman v. Wileman Bros & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 479 n.1 (1997) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council (Va. Pharmacy), 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
101 See, e.g., Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67.  
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the boundaries of core commercial speech, the inquiry ends.102 
However, it is generally accepted that speech can be overwhelmingly 
commercial in nature, but still do more than merely propose a 
commercial transaction.103 Thus, the Supreme Court formulated a 
second commercial speech definition to determine whether an 
expression is commercial or noncommercial speech.104  
 
2. The “Expanded” Commercial Speech Test 
 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York, the U.S. Supreme articulated a broader 
definition of commercial speech.105 The Court defined it as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
its audience.”106 At issue in Central Hudson was a state regulation 
ordering electric utility companies “to cease all advertising” promoting 
the use of electricity because of a fuel shortage.107 The regulation 
allowed informational advertising not clearly intended to promote 
sales, but it prohibited advertising intended to stimulate utility sales as 
contrary to national conservation policy.108 The appellant challenged 
the regulatory ban on promotional advertising as an unlawful restraint 
on commercial speech.109  
The Supreme Court determined that the state’s total ban on any 
form of promotional advertising restricted only commercial speech 
                                                 
102 See id. (“Proper classification” of speech containing commercial and 
noncommercial elements “presents a closer question.”).  
103 See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 639-640 (explaining examples of 
speech that does more than merely propose a commercial transaction, “but was 
obviously intended to propose a transaction”). 
104 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 561 (1980). 
105 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., et al., 507 U.S. 410, 423 
(1993). 
106 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; see also Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 423. 
107 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 559. 
108 Id. at 560. 
109 Id.  
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because the regulation’s ban specifically “excluded ‘institutional and 
informational’ messages.”110 The Central Hudson Court acknowledged 
that states could create content-based commercial speech regulations, 
but the Court concluded that the state’s promotional advertising ban 
violated the First Amendment because the regulation was more 
extensive than necessary to serve the states conservation interests.111  
Two of the Central Hudson Court’s concurring Justices criticized 
the majority’s definition of commercial speech.112 Justice Stevens in 
his concurrence, joined by Justice Brennan, found the state’s complete 
ban on promotional advertising extended beyond “mere proposals to 
engage in certain kinds of commercial transactions.”113 Justice Stevens 
determined the state’s order restricted expression “relating to the 
production and consumption of electrical energy” which he described 
as “questions frequently discussed and debated by our political 
leaders.”114 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that the state’s regulation 
allowed for the suppression of fully protected First Amendment speech 
“because it would outlaw . . . advertising that promoted electricity 
consumption by touting [its] environmental benefits.”115 As a result, 
Justice Stevens criticized the Central Hudson majority’s definition of 
commercial speech as “unquestionably too broad.”116 
In response, the Central Hudson majority declared there was “no 
support” for Justice Stevens’ claims.117 The majority determined that 
Justice Stevens’ narrow definition of commercial speech would “grant 
broad constitutional protection to any advertising that links a product 
                                                 
110 Id. at 561-562 n.5 
111 Id. at 571-72. 
112 Id. at 579-81 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the constitutional 
definition of commercial speech “should not include the entire range of 
communication that is embraced within the term ‘promotional advertising’”).   
113 Id. at 580. 
114 Id. at 581. 
115 Id. at 562 n.5 (majority opinion). 
116 Id. at 580-81 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The breadth of the ban thus 
exceeds the boundaries of the commercial speech concept, however that concept 
may be defined.”).  
117 Id. at 562 n.5 (majority opinion). 
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to a current public debate,” and they warned that this would “further 
blur the line” between commercial and noncommercial speech.118 
Thus, the Central Hudson majority held that although advertisers 
receive full First Amendment protections for “direct comments on 
public issues,” there was “no reason for providing similar 
constitutional protection when such statements are made only in the 
context of commercial transactions.”119 
Accordingly, the Central Hudson Court affirmatively determined 
that speech that did more than merely propose a commercial 
transaction could, in certain circumstances, constitute commercial 
speech.120  The Court effectively reasoned that appellant’s promotional 
advertisements only referenced a public issue in order to induce a 
potential commercial transaction.121 Thus, the Court effectively held 
that an expression’s overarching purpose can factor into a court’s 
determination of whether that expression constitutes commercial 
speech.122  The Court also effectively held that expression can 
constitute commercial speech even though it does not reference a 
product or service’s price, quantity, or availability.123 Therefore, the 
Central Hudson Court’s commercial speech definition broadly 
expands the amount of expression that can qualify as commercial 
speech.124  
                                                 
118 Id. The Central Hudson majority worried that further blurring the 
commercial/noncommercial speech distinction would lead to the fears the Supreme 
Court articulated in Ohralik; a dilution in the strength of First Amendment 
protections. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 559-563. 
121 Id. at 562 n.5.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.; see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., et al., 507 U.S. 
410, 423 (1993) (acknowledging that company’s mailing of informational pamphlets 
to potential customers would undoubtedly have been considered commercial speech 
under “the broader definition of commercial speech advanced in Central Hudson”). 
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Central Hudson’s “expanded” commercial speech test is the most 
encompassing definition of commercial speech.125 However, the 
Supreme Court has not applied this commercial speech definition to 
any case since Central Hudson because the “expanded” commercial 
speech test has been heavily criticized for its potential to inadvertently 
suppress speech that may deserve greater constitutional protection.126 
Thus, although the “expanded” commercial speech test “has never 
expressly been disavowed,” it “has largely fallen into disuse.”127 The 
Supreme Court’s apprehension of Central Hudson’s “expanded” 
commercial speech test led to the creation of a third test to determine 
the “proper classification” of speech that “presents a closer 
[constitutional] question.”128  
 
3. The “Bolger” Framework for Mixed Speech 
 
Three years after Central Hudson, the U.S. Supreme Court faced 
“a closer question” over the commercial/noncommercial speech 
distinction in Bolger.129 In Bolger, the appellee (“Youngs”) 
manufactured, sold, and distributed contraceptives, and marketed its 
products through a public “campaign of unsolicited mass mailings.”130 
Youngs marketed three materials to the public: (1) “multi-page, multi-
item flyers promoting a large variety of products available at a 
drugstore, including prophylactics;” (2) “flyers exclusively or 
substantially devoted to promoting prophylactics;” and (3) 
“informational pamphlets discussing the desirability and availability of 
prophylactics in general or Youngs’ products in particular.”131    
The appellant, United States Postal Service (“USPS”), sought to 
stop Youngs from mailing these materials under a federal statute 
                                                 
125 Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 423. 
126 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579-81; see also Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 423. 
127 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 516 n.6 (7th Cir. 2014). 
128 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 62. 
131 Id. 
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prohibiting “the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for 
contraceptives.”132  Youngs argued the federal statute was an 
“impermissible content-based restriction” on its mailings which 
Youngs proclaimed was “fully protected’ speech.”133 Conversely, 
USPS argued that all of Youngs’ mailings were commercial speech.134  
The Bolger Court began by acknowledging that it must carefully 
examine the federal statute’s application to Youngs’ mailings “to 
ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection [was] 
not inadvertently suppressed.”135 The Supreme Court quickly 
determined that Youngs’ first two mailings constituted core 
commercial speech because they consisted “primarily of price and 
quantity information.”136 However, the Court recognized that Youngs’ 
third mailing, the informational pamphlets, could not be “characterized 
merely as proposals to engage in commercial transaction.”137 As a 
result, the Court determined that Youngs’ informational pamphlets’ 
classification “as commercial or noncommercial speech” presented a 
closer constitutional question.138  
Youngs’ first informational pamphlet specifically described the 
advantages of several “Trojan-brand condoms” that Young’s 
manufactured.139 The second informational pamphlet, titled “Plain 
Talk about Venereal Disease,” discussed condoms generally, and only 
identified Youngs as the distributor of Trojan-brand condoms at the 
“very bottom of the last page.”140 Importantly, the Bolger Court noted 
                                                 
132 Id. at 63. The USPS alleged Youngs’ mailings violated 39 U.S.C. § 
3001(e)(2). 
133 Id. at 65-66. 
134 Id. at 66. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 66 n.12. 
137 Id. at 66. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 66 n.13. 
140 Id. 
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that a company’s general references to a product “does not . . . remove 
it from the realm of commercial speech.”141    
The Bolger Court identified three factors relevant to the 
commercial/noncommercial speech classification of Youngs’ 
informational pamphlets.142 First, the Court stated that the “mere fact 
that these pamphlets are conceded as advertisements clearly does not 
compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech.”143 Second, 
the Court indicated that “the reference to a specific product does not 
by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech.”144 Third, the Court 
found that “an economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets would 
clearly be insufficient by itself to turn the materials into commercial 
speech.”145 However, the Bolger Court held that the “combination of 
all these characteristics” strongly indicated that Youngs’ 
“informational pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial 
speech.”146 Yet, the Court noted that it was not necessary for all three 
characteristics to “be present in order for speech to be commercial” 
and further stated that it had “no opinion as to whether reference to 
any particular product or service is a necessary element of commercial 
speech.”147      
Ultimately, the Bolger Court concluded that Youngs’ 
informational pamphlets constituted commercial speech despite 
containing valuable information on important public issues.148 The 
Court held that Youngs’ informational pamphlets did not receive full 
First Amendment protection simply by “link[ing] a product to a 
current public debate.”149 The Court reiterated that a company only 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 66-67. 
143 Id. at 66. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 67. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 67-67 n.14. 
148 Id. at 68. 
149 Id. at 68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980)). 
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receives full First Amendment protection for its direct comments on 
public issues, and it does not receive “similar constitutional protection 
when such statements are made in the context of commercial 
transactions.”150 Thus, the Court reasoned that advertisers attempting 
to mislead the public should not be able to evade lawful regulation 
“simply by including references to public issues.”151  
Since Bolger, the U.S. Supreme Court has not had an opportunity 
to expand upon the three factor test. However, scholars and lower 
courts have reasoned that Bolger’s framework applies when speech is 
mixed with both commercial and noncommercial elements.152 The 
Bolger framework is generally applied according to this three-question 
inquiry: (1) was the speech an advertisement, (2) did the speech 
reference a specific product, and (3) was there an economic motivation 
for the speech?153 Like the Bolger Court determined, an affirmative 
answer to all three questions provides strong support for labeling the 
speech as commercial speech, but an affirmative to answer to all three 
questions is not a necessary condition of commercial speech.154 Thus, 
a “court must examine the ‘content, form, and context,’ of the speech 







                                                 
150 Id. 
151 Id.  
152 See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 97 
(1998). 
153 See, e.g., Pourous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1120 (1999). 
154 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-67 n.13. 
155 See Dryer v. National Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1118 (D. 
Minn., 2010) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-148 (1983); see also 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The diverse motives, means and 
messages of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely varying 
degrees.”)). 
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a. Is the Speech an Advertisement? 
 
The Bolger framework’s first factor centers on whether the 
challenged speech is an advertisement.156 Courts have considered 
speech an advertisement in a variety of circumstances. First, courts 
have classified speech as an advertisement when there is a concession 
that the speech is an advertisement.157 The Bolger Court stated that the 
fact that a challenged expression is conceded to be an advertisement 
does not by itself compel an expression’s classification as commercial 
speech.158 It follows then that a “company’s admission that the speech 
in question is advertising may strongly indicate that it is 
commercial.”159 
Second, courts consider speech that conveys an overwhelmingly 
positive tone to promote a brand or product to be advertisements.160 In 
Facenda v. National Football League Films, Inc., the Third Circuit 
determined that that N.F.L. Films, Inc.’s (“NFL”) video program, “The 
Making of Madden NFL 06,” constituted an advertisement because the 
program explained the product with only “a positive tone.”161 Notably, 
the Third Circuit reasoned that the fact that “‘no one in The Making of 
Madden had a negative thing to say about the game” rebutted any 
“argument that the program ha[d] a documentary purpose.” 162 
Moreover, in some cases a company’s use of its slogan or logo 
can help qualify speech as an advertisement.163 In Bad Frog Brewery v. 
                                                 
156 See, e.g., Facenda v. National Football League Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 
1017 (2008).  
157 See, e.g., Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112-113 (6th Cir. 
1995).  
158 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66. 
159 Semco, 52 F.3d at 113 (holding that because the speaker did not admit that 
its speech was an advertisement, the speech did constitute an advertisement under 
the Bolger framework). 
160 See, e.g., Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1017-1018. 
161 Id. at 1017. 
162 Id. at 1018. 
163 See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 
(1998). 
23
Albert: MJ Still Winning in Chicago: The Seventh Circuit Correctly Holds
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
409 
New York State Liquor Authority, the Second Circuit found that Bad 
Frog Brewery’s (“Bad Frog”) use of its logo on a beer label helped 
consumers identify the product’s source.164 The Second Circuit held 
this minimal information served to propose a commercial transaction 
and thus, constituted “a form of advertising.”165 
 
b. Does the Speech Reference a Specific Product? 
 
The Bolger framework’s second factor is satisfied when speech 
refers to a specific product or service.166 The Bolger Court held that 
Youngs identification of itself as the distributor of Trojan-brand 
prophylactics “at the very bottom of the last page” constituted a 
reference to a specific product.167 Similarly, the Third Circuit in 
Facenda held that Bolger’s second factor was “easily satisfied because 
the program’s sole subject [was] Madden NFL 06.” 168 
Furthermore, speech can refer to a specific product without 
reference to the product’s brand name.169 The Bolger Court explained 
that “a company with sufficient control of the market place for a 
product may be able to promote the product without reference to its 
own brand names.”170 Additionally, the D.C. Circuit in United States v. 
Phillip Morris USA, Inc., held that the fact that cigarette producers 
advertised “cigarettes generically without specific brand names . . . 
[did] not change the commercial nature of the speech.”171 Finally, a 
                                                 
164 Id. at 96. 
165 Id. at 96-97. 
166 See, e.g., Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 519-520 (7th Cir. 
2014).  
167 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 n.13 (1983). 
168 Facenda v. National Football League Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017 
(2008). 
169 See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1143-
1144 (2009).  
170 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 n.13.  
171 Phillip Morris USA, 566 F.3d at 1144 (citing Nat’l Comm’n on Egg 
Nutrition v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 570 F.2d 157, 163 (7th Cir. 1977).  
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district court found it plausible that a reference to a brand itself could 
constitute a reference to a specific product.172  
 
c. Does the Speaker Have an Economic Motivation for the 
Speech? 
 
The final Bolger factor asks whether the speaker has an economic 
purpose for the speech.173 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “all 
advertising is at least implicitly a plea for its audience’s custom,” and 
most courts acknowledge that almost every company has an economic 
motivation for their advertisements.174 Therefore, speech delivered in 
the context of a commercial transaction strongly indicates an 
economic motivation for the speech.175   
For example, in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case of 
Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, the appellants were a 
corporation doing business in Arab states.176 Many Arab countries 
enforced a trade boycott of Israel and sent questionnaires to companies 
doing business in Arab states inquiring about those companies’ 
relationships with Israel.177 Companies that did not answer the 
questionnaire were blacklisted from doing business in Arab states.178 
Federal law prohibited appellants from responding to the 
questionnaire, so they alleged the federal law violated their First 
Amendment rights.179 
The appellants conceded they had an economic motivation for the 
speech, but they argued that their dominant motivation for answering 
                                                 
172 Dryer v. National Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1120-1121 (D. 
Minn., 2010).  
173 E.g., Pourous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1120 (1999). 
174 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626, 639 (1985); see, e.g., Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (“no serious dispute that 
NFL has an economic motivation” for its speech). 
175 E.g Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68. 
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the questionnaire was to make a political statement.180 However, the 
Seventh Circuit disagreed, reasoning that appellants “proposed 
answers to [the] boycott questionnaires” only served to allow 
appellants “to maintain commercial dealings with the Arab world.”181 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that appellants had a substantial 
economic motivation for their proposed speech because it was 
delivered in the context of a commercial transaction.182   
Additionally, speech is economically motivated when its 
overarching purpose is to promote a company’s brand or product.183 
The Bolger Court found that Youngs had an economic motivation for 
distributing informational pamphlets to potential customers because 
the action served to promote Youngs’ products generally.184 Likewise, 
the Third Circuit in Facenda stated that Bolger’s third factor was 
satisfied because the program’s “general promotion of NFL-branded 
football provide[d] . . . indirect financial motivation.”185  
 
4. The “Inextricably Intertwined” Exception 
 
Before a court concludes that an expression containing both 
commercial and noncommercial elements is commercial speech, a 
court must determine whether the speech “merely links” the product or 
brand to a public issue or whether the commercial elements of the 
challenged speech are “inextricably intertwined” with the expression’s 
noncommercial elements such that the entire expression receives full 
                                                 
180 Id. at 917. 
181 Id. at 918. 
182 Id.  
183 See, e.g., Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1097 
(E.D. Cal., 2009).  
184 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983). 
185 Facenda v. National Football League Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017 
(2008). 
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First Amendment protection.186 This is known as the “inextricably 
intertwined” exception to commercial speech.187 
In 1980, the Supreme Court first explained the “inextricably 
intertwined” exception in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment.188 In Citizens for a Better Environment, a village 
ordinance prohibited door-to-door solicitation “of contributions by 
charitable organizations that do not use at least 75 percent of their 
receipts for ‘charitable purposes.’”189 The respondent, a charitable 
organization promoting environmental protection, applied for a permit 
“to solicit contributions in the Village.”190 However, the village denied 
the request because respondent “could not demonstrate that 75 percent 
of its receipts would be used for ‘charitable purposes.’”191 Respondent 
sued the village, arguing the ordinance violated the First Amendment.192  
The Citizens for a Better Environment Court noted that charitable 
fundraising involves First Amendment protected speech, including the 
“propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes.”193 The 
Court recognized that regulations regarding the solicitation of funds 
must account “for the reality that solicitation is characteristically 
intertwined with . . . speech seeking support for particular causes” 
regarding important public issues.194 The Court further reasoned “that 
without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would 
likely cease.”195 Therefore, the Court concluded that charitable 
solicitations are not “a variety of purely commercial speech,” and that 
respondent’s charitable solicitations were entitled to full First 
                                                 
186 See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474-475 (1989). 
187 Id. 
188 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 440 U.S. 620 (1980). 
189 Id. at 622. 
190 Id. at 624. 
191 Id. at 625. 
192 Id. 
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Amendment protection.196 Thus, the Citizens for a Better Environment 
Court held that speech combining commercial and noncommercial 
elements receives full First Amendment protection when elimination 
of an expression’s commercial elements would essentially eliminate 
the speaker’s opportunity to disseminate the expression’s 
noncommercial elements.197  
Eight years later, The Supreme addressed the “inextricably 
intertwined” exception again in Riley v. National Federation of the 
Blind of North Carolina.198 In Riley, a North Carolina law required 
charitable fundraisers “to disclose to potential donors . . . the 
percentage of charitable contributions collected during the previous 12 
months that were actually turned over to charity.”199 A coalition of 
charitable organizations brought suit against North Carolina alleging 
this law violated their First Amendment rights.200 North Carolina 
countered that this law only regulated “commercial speech because it 
relat[ed] only to the professional fundraiser’s profit from the solicited 
contribution.”201  
The Riley Court held that speech does not “retain its commercial 
character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully 
protected speech.”202 In a later case, the Supreme Court explained that 
the charitable organization’s commercial speech in Riley was 
inextricably intertwined “because state law required it to be included” 
with the noncommercial speech.203 Accordingly, the Riley Court 
determined that commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined” with 
noncommercial speech when their combination is required by law.204   
                                                 
196 Id. at 632-633. 
197 Id. at 632. 
198 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).  
199 Id. at 786. 
200 Id.at 787. 
201 Id. at 795. 
202 Id. at 796. 
203 Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 796). 
204 Id. (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 796). 
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In 1989, the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees. v. Fox combined 
the Citizens for a Better Environment and Riley holdings into one 
uniform rule.205 In Fox, a state university regulation prevented “private 
commercial enterprises” from operating on state university campus 
facilities.206 However, a company marketed houseware products to 
college students by “demonstrating and offering products for sale to 
groups of 10 or more prospective buyers at gatherings” hosted in 
college dormitories.207 During these gatherings, the company also 
distributed information on other subjects such as financial 
responsibility and home economics.208 A company representative 
hosted a gathering “in a student’s dormitory room” and the campus 
police charged her with violating the university’s regulation.209 The 
students brought suit against the university alleging the regulation 
violated their First Amendment rights.210 
The Fox Court held there was “no doubt” that the company’s 
gatherings constituted commercial speech.211 Nevertheless, the 
students argued that the company’s “pure speech and commercial 
speech [were] ‘inextricably intertwined’” such that the entire speech 
must be considered noncommercial.212 The Supreme Court disagreed 
and stated that commercial speech is “inextricably intertwined” when 
the law requires it to be included with noncommercial speech.213 The 
Fox Court elaborated on the boundaries of the “inextricably 
intertwined” exception, declaring: 
 
By contrast, there is nothing whatever ‘inextricable’ about the 
noncommercial aspects of these presentations. No law of man 
                                                 
205 Fox, 492 U.S. at 474-475. 
206 Id. at 471-472. 
207 Id. at 472. 
208 Id. at 474. 
209 Id. at 472. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 473. 
212 Id. at 474. 
213 Id. at 474-475. 
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or nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without 
teaching home economics, or to teach home economics 
without selling housewares. Nothing in the resolution 
prevents the speaker from conveying, or the audience from 
hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the 
nature of things requires them to be combined with 
commercial messages.214 
 
Therefore, the Fox Court determined that because “no law of man 
or nature” required the company to combine the “teaching of home 
economics” with “selling housewares,” the company’s commercial and 
noncommercial speech were not “inextricably intertwined.”215 Thus, 
the Fox Court combined the Citizens for a Better Environment and 
Riley holdings into one succinct rule: commercial speech is 
“inextricably intertwined” with noncommercial speech, such that the 
entire speech receives full First Amendment protection, when a “law 
of man or nature” requires the combination of the speech’s commercial 
and noncommercial elements.216     
 
F. The Current Interpretation and Application of Commercial 
Speech Doctrine 
 
In addition to defining the “inextricably intertwined” exception, 
the Fox Court also affirmatively defined commercial speech as speech 
that seeks to “propose a commercial transaction,” noting that it “is the 
test for identifying commercial speech.”217 The phrase “propose a 
commercial transaction” is not as limiting as the phrase “no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.”218 Thus, the implication is that 
                                                 
214 Id. at 474. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 474-475.  
217 Id. at 473-474 (1989) (stating that it was “clear about the difference 
between commercial and noncommercial speech”). 
218 See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 516-517 (7th Cir. 
2014) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983)). 
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speech need not be “purely commercial” to constitute commercial 
speech.219 As a result, the Bolger framework essentially functions to 
determine whether an expression is “part and parcel” of a proposal for 
a commercial transaction.220 While some ambiguity exists at the 
commercial speech doctrine’s margins, the hallmark of commercial 
speech is that it in some capacity seeks to propose a commercial 
transaction.221 What the lower courts cannot agree on is whether the 
phrase “propose a commercial transaction” applies in a narrow or 
broad context.           
 
II. PRIVATE-RIGHT DISPUTES INVOLVING IMAGE 
ADVERTISEMENTS PRIOR TO JORDAN V. JEWEL FOOD 
STORES, INC.  
 
The commercial speech doctrine is difficult to apply in cases 
involving advertisements incorporating celebrity identities because the 
crux of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech cases centered on 
whether a government’s regulation of commercial speech violated the 
First Amendment.222 However, in the case at issue, Jordan’s claims are 
                                                 
219 See id. (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-68); see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-
474  (defining commercial speech as speech that proposes a commercial transaction, 
not speech that “does no more than propose a commercial transaction”); see also 
Am. Future Sys., Inc., v. Pa. State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 862 (1984) (holding that 
expressions “were not ‘within the core notions of commercial speech’ because they 
did more than simply propose a commercial transaction”); but see Mattel, Inc. v. 
MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If speech is not ‘purely 
commercial’ – that is, it does no more than propose a commercial transaction—then 
it is entitled to full First Amendment protection.”). 
220 Am. Future Sys., 752 F.2d at 862. 
221 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (Stating that “precise bounds of the category of expression that 
may be termed commercial speech” are “subject to doubt”); see also Briggs & 
Stratton Corp. v. Baldridge, 728 F.2d 915, 917-18 (7th Cir. 1984).  
222 See Jordan, 743 F.3d at 514 (“In the public-law context, the 
commercial/noncommercial classification determines the proper standard of scrutiny 
to apply to the law or regulation under review.”). 
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not based on a government regulation, but instead, they are against a 
private company.223  
The Supreme Court has never addressed the 
commercial/noncommercial speech distinction from an “intellectual-
property rights” versus “free-speech rights” context.224 Thus, 
attempting to apply the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine 
in a “private rights” context is like trying to fit square pegs into round 
holes.225 As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, appellate court 
decisions addressing commercial speech in a private rights context 
“are a conflicting mix of balancing tests and frameworks” resulting in 
conflicting applications of the commercial speech doctrine.226   
Few cases have addressed the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction in a private rights context prior to Jordan v. Jewel Food 
Stores, Inc. In 1996, the Tenth Circuit heard a challenge by the Major 
League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) against an 
Oklahoma printing company in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n.227 The MLBPA threatened legal action against 
Cadtoons for their intention to sell baseball “parody” trading cards that 
included player caricatures and “humorous commentary about their 
careers.”228 The MLBPA argued that Cardtoons’ parody trading cards 
were commercial speech and therefore, received less First Amendment 
protection.229  
The Tenth Circuit held that Cardtoons’ parody trading cards were 
not commercial speech because they did not “merely advertise another 
                                                 
223 Id. 
224 Id. (“The Supreme Court has not addressed the question”). 
225 See Gilbert, supra note 72, at 597 (noting that the Supreme Court never set 
out to define commercial speech, but instead address the constitutionality of a 
regulation). 
226 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 514. 
227 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 
(1996). 
228 Id.  
229 Id. at 970. 
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unrelated product.”230 The Court determined that the cards provided 
“social commentary on public figures, major league baseball players, 
who are involved in a significant commercial enterprise.”231 Thus, the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that Cardtoons’ parody trading cards received 
full First Amendment protection.232       
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit heard Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc.233 In Hoffman, actor Dustin Hoffman starred in the 1982 movie 
“Tootsie, playing a male actor” dressed as a woman to get a part on a 
television show.234 A “still photograph” from “Tootsie” displayed 
Hoffman “in a red long-sleeved sequined evening dress and high 
heels, posing in front of an American Flag.”235 A magazine published, 
without Hoffman’s permission, an article altering the “Tootise” still to 
make Hoffman appear to be wearing “Spring 1997 fashions.”236 
Hoffman sued the publisher for the misappropriation of his name and 
likeness, and argued that the publisher’s use of the photograph was 
commercial speech.237  
The Ninth Circuit held that the publisher’s use of the “Tootsie” 
photograph was not pure commercial speech because the publisher 
“did not use Hoffman’s image in a traditional advertisement printed 
merely for the purpose of selling a particular product.”238 The Court 
reasoned that “in context, the article as whole [was] a combination of 
fashion photography, humor, visual and verbal editorial comment on 
                                                 
230 Id. (The Tenth Circuit, without explanation, did not analyze the issue under 
the Bolger framework or the “inextricably intertwined” exception). 
231 Id. at 969. 
232 Id. 
233 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (2001). 
234 Id. at 1182.  
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 1183. 
237 Id. at 1183-1184. 
238 Id. at 1185. (The Ninth Circuit identified “the ‘core notion of commercial 
speech’” as speech that “‘does no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” 
However, the Court made no mention of the Bolger framework). 
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classic films and famous actors.”239 As a result, the Court reasoned 
that any commercial aspects of the publisher’s article were 
“‘inextricably intertwined’ with expressive elements,” and could not 
be separated “from the fully protected whole.”240 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the publisher’s article was not “a purely 
‘commercial’ form of expression,” and therefore, it did not constitute 
commercial speech.241 
In 2008, the Third Circuit decided Facenda.242 There, N.F.L Films 
Inc. (“NFL Films”) used portions of broadcaster John Facenda’s 
“voice-over work” in their “television production about the video 
game ‘Madden NFL 06.’”243 Facenda’s estate sued NFL films for false 
endorsement under the federal Lanham Act.244 NFL Films argued that 
its production constituted informational and artistic expression 
protected by the First Amendment.245 Facenda’s estate countered that 
the production was commercial speech entitled to lesser protection.246  
The Third Circuit applied the Bolger framework and found that 
NFL Films’ production was an advertisement because it was released 
in the days immediately before the game went on sale in retail stores, 
“much like an advertisement for an upcoming film.”247 The Court 
noted that the production did not refer to any other products and that 
“the video game’s general promotion of NFL-branded football 
provide[d] an additional indirect financial motivation.”248 Accordingly, 
the Third Circuit held that NFL Films’ production was commercial 
                                                 
239 Id. (Notably, the Court determined that the publisher’s use of the “still” did 
not solely advance a commercial message, but instead was “a compliment to” the 
magazine’s overarching theme on “Hollywood.”). 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 1186. 
242 Facenda v. National Football League Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (2008).  
243 Id. at 1011. 
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 1015. 
246 Id. at 1016. 
247 Id. at 1017. 
248 Id.  
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speech, and it was not close to the boundary “dividing commercial and 
noncommercial speech.”249 
In sum, the circuits are split on the interpretation and application 
of the commercial speech doctrine in the context of private right 
disputes. Some courts employ a narrow construction of commercial 
speech while others find that the commercial speech doctrine should 
apply in a broad context.250 Courts also give varying weights to the 
three Bolger factors.251 Finally, the courts diverge on the scope of the 
inextricably intertwined exception; some courts, like the Seventh 
Circuit in Jordan, apply a narrow scope, while others like the Ninth 
Circuit in Hoffman, apply a broad scope.252      
 
III. A SUMMARY OF JORDAN V. JEWEL FOOD STORES, INC.  
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. began as a “right-of-publicity 
dispute” pitting basketball hall of famer Michael Jordan (“Jordan”) 
against Jewel Food Stores, Inc. (“Jewel”).253 Jewel, commonly known 
as “Jewel-Osco,” operates approximately 175 grocery stores in the 
Chicago-land area.254 While many outside the Midwest may be 
unfamiliar with Jewel-Osco supermarkets, most people know of 
Michael Jordan, the former superstar Chicago bulls’ basketball 
                                                 
249 Id. at 1017-1018. 
250 See id.; see also Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185-
86 (2001). 
251 See, e.g., Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112-114 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
252 See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 519-520 (7th Cir. 
2014); see Hoffman, 255 F.3d 1185-1186.  
253 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 511. 
254 Id.; Jewel was Founded in 1899. Today Jewel is owned by New Albertson’s 
Inc., a privately held grocery company. In addition to operating supermarkets across 
the Midwest, Jewel Food Stores, Inc. actively supports local charitable and not-for-
profit organizations. See Jewel-Osco, http://www.jewelosco.com/our-
company/traditions-history/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
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player.255 During his career Jordan won numerous championships and 
awards, and the N.B.A.’s official website refers to Jordan as “the 
greatest basketball player of all time.”256     
Upon Jordan’s induction into the Basketball Hall of Fame on 
September 11, 2009, Sports Illustrated, published by Time, Inc. 
(“Time”), developed “a special edition of Sports Illustrated Presents” 
to celebrate Jordan’s career.257 The commemorative issue was titled 
“Jordan: Celebrating a Hall of Fame Career” and was only available 
for purchase in select stores.258 The special issue’s cover page was a 
picture of Jordan flying through the air appearing likely to throw down 
a slam-dunk.259    
Prior to publication, Time offered Jewel free advertising space 
inside this special issue in exchange for Jewel’s promise “to stock and 
sell the magazine in its stores.”260 Jewel accepted Time’s offer and 
designed a “full page” advertisement (“ad”) for the magazine.261 
Jewel’s ad combined “textual, photographic, and graphic elements,” 
and it included Jewel’s logo and slogan in the ad’s center.262 Jewel’s 
logo and slogan “are both registered trademarks” and were located in 
                                                 
255 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 512 n.1.  
256 Jordan is most well-known for leading the Bulls to three consecutive NBA 
championships from 1991-1993, and after a brief retirement, leading the Bulls to 
three more consecutive championships from 1996-1998. See Legends Profile: 
Michael Jordan, NBA History, http://www.nba.com/history/legends/michael-
jordan/index.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2015); see also, Jordan, 743 F.3d at 513 
(“Jordan is a sports icon whose name and image are deeply embedded in the popular 
culture and easily recognized around the globe.”).   
257 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 512. Sports Illustrated, published by Time Inc., is a 
magazine delivering sports related content to its subscribers. Sports Illustrated 
Presents is a special tribute edition of the magazine used to commemorate an 
athlete’s career. See Sports Illustrated, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sports_Illustrated (last visited Apr. 30, 2015). 
258 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 512.  
259 See Jordan, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. 
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the ad “above a photo of a pair of basketball shoes.”263 The number 
that Jordan wore for most of his time with the Chicago Bulls, 23, 
features prominently on “the tongue of each shoe.”264 The text in 
Jewel’s ad is positioned above the shoes, logo, and slogan, and it 
reads:265 
A Shoe In! 
After six NBA championships, scores of rewritten record 
books and numerous buzzer beaters, Michael Jordan’s 
elevation in the Basketball Hall of Fame was never in doubt! 
Jewel-Osco salutes #23 on his many accomplishments as we 
honor a fellow Chicagoan who was “just around the corner” 
for so many years. 
 




Time accepted Jewel’s ad, and placed it in the commemorative issues’ 
inside back cover.267 
                                                 
263 Id. 
264 Jordan, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. 
265 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2014). 
266 Id. at 523. 
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B. Procedural Background 
 
After Sports Illustrated released this commemorative issue, Jordan 
filed suit against Jewel in the Circuit Court of Cook County alleging 
that Jewel “improperly used his identity without authorization” and 
sought “$5 million in damages.”268 Jewel removed the case to federal 
court and “moved for summary judgment.”269 Jewel argued that “its ad 
qualified as ‘noncommercial’ speech,” and therefore, it received full 
First Amendment protection.270 Jordan filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that Jewel’s “ad was a commercial use of 
his identity” and qualified as commercial speech.271 Both Jewel and 
Jordan agreed that a holding that Jewel’s ad was noncommercial 
speech defeated Jordan’s claims and vice-a-versa.272 The district court 
ruled in favor of Jewel, and Jordan appealed.273   
 
C. The District Court’s Decision 
 
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois used the 
“core” commercial speech test as well as the Bolger framework, and it 
found Jewel’s ad was “noncommercial speech entitled to full First 
Amendment protection.”274 The district court also noted that even if 
Jewel’s ad contained commercial elements, those elements were 
                                                                                                                   
267 Id. (The commemorative issue also included a congratulatory ad from a 
“rival Chicago-area grocery chain.”). 
268 Id. at 513 (Jordan alleged Jewel’s ad violated the Illinois Right of Publicity 
Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Illinois 
common law of unfair competition, and the federal Lanham Act). 
269 Id. at 513. 
270 Id.   
271 Id. 
272 Id. Jewel and Jordan agreed that the classification of Jewel’s ad as 
commercial or noncommercial speech was dispositive to the outcome of the case.  
273 Id.  
274 Jordan, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1106-1111. The District Court made no mention 
of the Central Hudson’s expanded commercial speech inquiry. 
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inextricably intertwined with the noncommercial elements, “rendering 
the page noncommercial as a whole.”275 
Regarding the commercial speech distinction, the district court 
employed a narrow interpretation of commercial speech and held that 
Jewel’s ad was noncommercial speech because it did not directly 
propose a commercial transaction.276 The district court found that 
Jewel’s ad did not propose a commercial transaction because “readers 
would be at a loss to explain what they have been invited to buy.”277  
Furthermore, the district court reasoned that Jordan’s assertion 
that Jewel’s use of its logo and slogan in the congratulatory text 
invited “readers to enter into a commercial transaction” “utterly 
fail[ed] to account for context.”278 The district court held that Jewel’s 
ad did not propose a commercial transaction because the ad focused on 
Jordan, not on Jewel and its products and services.279 Thus, the district 
court concluded that a “reasonable reader” would agree that Jewel 
touted Jordan’s accomplishments “as a means to congratulate him” on 
his hall of fame induction and not as means of proposing a commercial 
transaction.280 
Moreover, the district court declared its holding was confirmed by 
an application of the Bolger framework.281 With regards to Bolger’s 
first factor, the district court determined “Jewel’s page” did not 
constitute an advertisement for several reasons.282 First, although 
Jewel even referred to its page as an “ad,” the district court determined 
that Jewel’s use of “the word ‘ad’ clearly was used as convenient 
shorthand” because there was no equally precise term for the page that 
                                                 
275 Id. at 1108. 
276 Id. at 1106-1108. 
277 Id. at 1107. 
278 Id.  
279 Id. The District Court also noted that Jewel’s use of the logo and slogan 
ensured that the reader understood the congratulatory message came from Jewel. 
280 Id. at 1108. 
281 Id. at 1108-1109. The District Court viewed the Bolger Framework as an 
alternative method for determining whether speech “proposes a commercial 
transaction.”  
282 Id. at 1109-1110. 
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Jewel placed in the issue.283 Notably, the district court emphasized the 
presence of a rival grocery store chain’s page in the commemorative 
issue, that also congratulated Jordan, strongly weighed against finding 
Jewel’s page was an advertisement.284 The district court reasoned that 
a reasonable reader could not conclude that Jordan endorsed Jewel 
while also endorsing a rival supermarket, and thus, they would know 
that “Jewel’s page was not an advertisement.”285  
With respect to Bolger’s remaining factors, the district court held 
that Jewel’s ad did not satisfy either the second or third factor.286 The 
district court determined that Jewel’s use of its logo and slogan only 
evoked Jewel’s products and services in general, and did not qualify as 
a reference to a specific product or service.287 The district court noted 
that “of course” Jewel had an economic motivation to place the page 
but ultimately held that Jewel’s economic motivation to place the page 
did not overcome the missing Bolger elements.288  
As a result, the district court held it would be “highly unlikely” 
that a reasonable reader would “conclude that Jewel was linking itself 
to Jordan in order to propose a commercial transaction.”289 Further, the 
court declared, without any explanation, that even if Jewel’s page 
contained minimal commercial elements, those elements were 
inextricably intertwined with the page’s noncommercial elements.290 
Accordingly, the district court concluded that Jewel’s page “was 
noncommercial speech entitled to full First Amendment protection.”291 
 
 
                                                 
283 Id. at 1109. Also, the District Court noted that Jewel did not pay money to 
place its page in the magazine. 
284 Id. at 1110. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 1110-1111. 
287 Id. at 1110. 
288 Id. at 1111. 
289 Id. at 1108.  
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 1111. 
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D. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision 
 
Jordan appealed the district court’s ruling to the Seventh 
Circuit.292 The appeal was heard by a three-judge panel consisting of 
Judge Flaum, Judge Sykes, and Judge Randa of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by 
designation.293 Judge Sykes, writing for a unanimous panel, reversed 
the District Court’s ruling and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.294          
Before applying the commercial speech doctrine to Jewel’s ad, the 
Seventh Circuit first outlined its definition of commercial speech.295 
The Court defined commercial speech as “speech that proposes a 
commercial transaction,” but noted that “this definition was just a 
starting point.”296 Further, the Court reasoned that while speech “that 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction ‘falls within the 
core notion of commercial speech,’ other communications” outside of 
this core notion “may also ‘constitute commercial speech.’”297 Thus, 
the Seventh Circuit declared that it was “a mistake to assume that the 
boundaries of the commercial-speech category are marked exclusively 
by this ‘core’ definition.”298 
The Seventh Circuit elaborated on its commercial speech doctrine 
interpretation, and reasoned that the “notion that an advertisement 
counts as ‘commercial’ only if it makes an appeal to purchase a 
                                                 
292 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 2014). 
293 Id. at 510.  
294 Id. at 512.  
295 Id. at 515-517. 
296 Id. at 516. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has “also defined commercial speech as ‘expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.’” (internal citations omitted). However, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that this definition “has largely fallen into disuse.” Id. at 
516 n.6. 
297 Id. at 516. 
298 Id. The Court reiterated this sentiment, stating that “the commercial-speech 
category is not limited to speech that directly or indirectly proposes a commercial 
transaction.”). Id. at 517. 
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particular product makes no sense today” because modern commercial 
advertising is creative, “abstract, and frequently relies on subtle 
cues.”299 Therefore, the court determined that an “advertisement is no 
less ‘commercial’ because it promotes brand awareness or loyalty 
rather than explicitly proposing a transaction in a specific product or 
service” because “often the commercial message is general and 
implicit rather than specific and explicit.”300 
Under this doctrinal premise, the Seventh Circuit found that 
Jewel’s ad served the dual functions of congratulating Jordan and 
promoting Jewel’s supermarkets.301 The Court stated that Jewel’s 
tribute to Jordan was “explicit and readily apparent,” but, when 
considered in context, Jewel’s ad had the “unmistakable commercial 
function [of] enhancing the Jewel-Osco brand in the minds of 
consumers.”302 Thus, the Court determined that Jewel’s promotion of 
its own brand in its ad was “implicit but easily inferred” and was the 
ad’s “dominant” purpose.303 Notably, the Court scrutinized Jewel’s use 
of its slogan and logo, finding that the slogan and logo’s size, style, 
color, and location in the ad indicated that the ad “plainly aimed at 
fostering goodwill for the Jewel brand” and was “for the purpose of 
increasing patronage of Jewel-Osco stores.”304  
                                                 
299 Id. at 518. The Court further reasoned that “[a]pplying the ‘core’ definition 
too rigidly ignores this reality.” Id. 
300 Id.   
301 Id. 
302 Id. The ad’s “textual focus” was a “congratulatory salute to Jordan.” Id. at 
517. However, the Court determined that “evaluating the text requires consideration 
of its context, and this truism has special force when applying the commercial 
speech doctrine.” Id.    
303 Id. at 518. Jewel argued that its salute to Jordan was a public-service 
announcement similar to its “practice of commending local community groups on 
notable achievements.” Id. However, the Court dismissed this argument, noting that 
there is a “world of difference between an ad congratulating a local community 
group, and an ad congratulating a famous athlete.” Id.  
304 Id. The Court noted that Jewel’s logo and slogan “prominently featured in 
the center of the ad and in a font size larger than any other on the page” and that this 
“set them off from the congratulatory text, drawing attention to Jewel-Osco’s 
sponsorship of the tribute.” Id. 
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit conceded that while Jewel’s ad 
did not reference a specific product or service, the court reasoned that 
Jewel’s ad invited readers to buy products generally from Jewel, such 
as “a loaf of bread [or] a gallon of milk.”305 The court held that simply 
because Jewel’s ad “promote[d] brand loyalty rather than a specific 
product” did not mean that Jewel’s ad was ‘noncommercial.’”306 Thus, 
the court reasoned that although the ad’s commercial message was 
“generic and implicit,” the ad clearly served as “a form of image 
advertising aimed at promoting goodwill for the Jewel-Osco brand by 
exploiting public affection for Jordan at an auspicious moment in his 
career.”307 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that Jewel’s ad 
proposed a commercial transaction and constituted commercial 
speech.308  
Additionally, like the district court confirmed its decision through 
application of the Bolger framework, here the Seventh Circuit also 
determined its conclusion was confirmed “by application of the Bolger 
framework.”309 With regard to Bolger’s first factor, the court held that 
“Jewel’s ad certainly qualifie[d] as an advertisement in form” because 
the ad promoted Jewel-Osco supermarkets to potential buyers.310 The 
court also found that Jewel’s ad constituted an advertisement because 
it was “easily distinguishable” from the magazine’s “editorial coverage 
of Jordan’s career.”311 Finally, the Seventh Circuit determined that 
Jewel’s ad was an advertisement because, in context, it looked like an 
advertisement.312  
                                                 




308 Id. at 519-520. 
309 Id. at 519.  The Seventh Circuit found that the Bolger framework applies 
when speech “contains both commercial and noncommercial elements.” Id.   
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Upon analyzing Bolger’s second factor, the court determined that 
although that ad did not offer a “specific product or service . . . the ad 
promote[d] patronage at Jewel-Osco stores more generally.”313 
Notably, the court stated that an ad’s failure to reference a specific 
product “is far from dispositive, especially where ‘image’ or brand 
advertising rather than product advertising is concerned.”314 In fact, 
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[t]o say that the ad is 
noncommercial because it lacks an outright sales pitch is to artificially 
distinguish between product advertising and image advertising.”315  
Finally, the Seventh Circuit held that Jewel’s ad satisfied Bolger’s 
third factor by declaring that there was “no question that the ad served 
an economic purpose.”316 The court found it obvious that “Jewel had 
something to gain by conspicuously joining the chorus of 
congratulations on the much-anticipated occasion of Jordan’s 
induction into the Basketball Hall of Fame.”317 Moreover, the Seventh 
Circuit addressed the negative policy implications of the district 
court’s holding, reasoning that “[c]lassifying this kind of advertising as 
constitutionally immune noncommercial speech would permit 
advertisers to misappropriate” athlete and celebrity identities “with 
impunity.”318 Thus, the court concluded that Jewel’s ad satisfied the 
Bolger framework and constituted “commercial speech.”319 
Before concluding, the Seventh Circuit addressed the “proper use” 
of the inextricably intertwined doctrine.320 The Seventh Circuit 
determined that the inextricably intertwined exception’s “central 
inquiry is not whether the speech in question combines commercial 
and noncommercial elements, but whether it was legally or practically 
                                                 
313 Id. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 520. 
316 Id. at 519-520.  
317 Id. at 520.  
318 Id.  
319 Id. at 519-522. 
320 Id. at 520. 
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impossible for the speaker to separate them.”321 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the “commercial and noncommercial elements of 
Jewel’s ad were not inextricably intertwined” because “[n]o law of 
man or nature compelled Jewel to combine the commercial and 
noncommercial messages” in its ad.322 Accordingly, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed that Jewel’s ad constituted commercial speech.323  
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision to Apply the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine with a Broad Scope was Proper and is the 
Best Path Forward 
 
The Seventh Circuit correctly determined that the commercial 
speech doctrine applies with a broad, rather than narrow, scope. The 
court’s flexible application of the commercial speech doctrine was 
proper because it allowed the court to consider Jewel’s ad in context, 
rather than in isolation. Upon consideration of the ad’s entire context, 
the court reasoned that Jewel’s ad’s primary purpose was not to pay 
tribute to Jordan, but it was instead to promote Jewel’s brand to its 
potential customers.324 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s flexible application 
of the commercial speech doctrine provided the court the opportunity 
to reach the “commonsense” conclusion that Jewel’s ad constituted 
commercial speech.  
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit’s flexible interpretation of 
commercial speech was proper because (1) the case law supports the 
Court’s broad application of the commercial speech doctrine, and (2) 
the practical outcomes of the Court’s flexible application of 
commercial speech doctrine demonstrate that a broad interpretation of 
commercial speech is the best path forward in private-right 
commercial speech cases.         
                                                 
321 Id. at 521. 
322 Id. at 522. 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 518. 
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1. The Seventh Circuit’s Flexible Interpretation of “Speech that 
Proposes a Commercial Transaction” is Supported by Case 
Law 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court consistently relies on the “commonsense 
differences between speech proposing a commercial transaction and 
other varieties” to find that a variety of expressions qualify as 
commercial speech.325 Here, the Seventh Circuit’s decision properly 
interpreted these “commonsense differences” to effectively apply a 
flexible, rather than rigid, commercial speech interpretation to this 
case. Although some circuits find that “speech that proposes a 
commercial transaction” should apply with a narrow scope that is 
virtually identical to the “core” commercial speech test, most courts 
interpret the commercial speech doctrine to apply broadly.326 While 
there is some ambiguity concerning commercial speech’s doctrinal 
boundaries, the Seventh Circuit’s application of a flexible definition of 
“speech that proposes a commercial transaction” is supported by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent.327    
First, the Seventh Circuit correctly determined the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s changes to its commercial speech definition implied a tacit 
support for a flexible, rather than rigid, application of the commercial 
speech doctrine. Originally, the Virginia Pharmacy Court defined 
commercial speech as “speech that does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.”328 However, the Fox Court altered the 
                                                 
325 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 
471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). 
326 See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-86 (2001) 
(applying a narrow interpretation of commercial speech); see Bad Frog Brewery v. 
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 (1998) (applying a broad interpretation 
of commercial speech). 
327 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., et al., 507 U.S. 410, 419 
(1993) (noting the difficulty in “drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin 
commercial speech in a distinct category”). 
328 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council (Va. 
Pharmacy), 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).  
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wording of its commercial speech definition to simply “speech that 
proposes a commercial transaction.”329 The Seventh Circuit inferred 
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s subtraction of “no more than” from its 
commercial speech definition implied that commercial speech 
encompassed expression beyond merely “core” commercial speech.330 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit determined that it was “a mistake to assume 
that the boundaries of the commercial speech category are marked 
exclusively by th[e] ‘core’ definition.”331 Accordingly, the Seventh 
Circuit’s broad, rather than narrow, commercial speech interpretation 
properly accounted for the U.S. Supreme Court’s changes to its 
commercial speech definition.  332 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit appropriately reasoned that the 
Bolger Court’s holding further supported a broad, rather than narrow, 
application of the commercial speech doctrine. The Seventh Circuit 
noted that Bolger defined “speech that did no more than propose a 
commercial transaction” as “core” commercial speech.333 Yet, the 
court noted that Bolger also held that informational pamphlets that did 
not directly propose a commercial transaction qualified as commercial 
speech.334 Therefore, because Bolger explicitly held that speech 
consisting of both commercial and noncommercial elements 
constituted commercial speech, the Seventh Circuit appropriately 
                                                 
329 Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-474 (1989). 
330 See Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 516 n.7 (7th Cir. 
2014).  
331 Id. The Court further stated that the “core” definition of commercial speech 
“is just a starting point” because other types of communication could also constitute 
commercial speech. Id. 
332 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly rejected Central 
Hudson’s formulation of commercial speech. Id. at 516 n.6. The Cincinnati Court 
found that Central Hudson’s iteration of commercial speech encompassed 
expression far beyond “core” commercial speech. Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 423. 
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to nullify Central Hudson’s expanded 
commercial speech test is also tacit support for a flexible, rather than rigid, 
commercial speech interpretation. 
333 See Jordan, 743 F.3d at 516-517 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983)). 
334 Id. at 517 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67). 
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relied on Bolger to apply a flexible interpretation of commercial 
speech that extends beyond “core” commercial speech.335    
The Seventh Circuit correctly noted that most courts cite the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s precedents to apply a flexible interpretation of the 
commercial speech doctrine.336 Nevertheless, the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits apply a narrow definition of commercial speech. In Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that speech was 
“entitled to full First Amendment protection” because it was not 
“purely commercial.”337 Similarly, in Cardtoons the Tenth Circuit 
determined that a company’s parody trading cards were not 
commercial speech simply because they did not “advertise another 
unrelated product.”338  
However, in both cases the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial speech was not either Court’s primary focus. Both the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s engaged in merely a cursory review of the 
Supreme Court’s commercial speech precedents, and their incomplete 
analysis led to their incorrect conclusions of law.339 In fact, the 
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits all found that 
the Supreme Court’s commercial speech precedents support a broad 
application of the commercial speech doctrine that encompasses 
expression beyond “core” commercial speech.340 Accordingly, the 
                                                 
335 Id. at 516-517. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that Bolger was “instructive” 
toward determining the proper interpretation of the “commonsense distinction[s]” 
between different varieties of speech. Id. at 517. 
336 See Jordan, 743 F.3d at 516; see also Dryer v. National Football League, 
689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (D. Minn., 2010) (citing to Cincinnati, Fox, Bolger, and 
Central Hudson to declare that it would not limit its commercial speech analysis to 
only “core” commercial speech because commercial speech has an “elastic 
definition”). 
337 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 
338 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 
(1996). 
339 See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (Ninth Circuit only spent one page discussing 
commercial speech); see Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970 (Tenth Circuit only devoted one 
paragraph to commercial speech issue). 
340 See, e.g., Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112-114 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(Although Mr. Kopp’s article does more than merely propose a commercial 
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Seventh Circuit’s use of a flexible, rather than rigid, commercial 
speech interpretation was proper because it is supported the Supreme 
Court’s commercial speech precedents and the majority of other court 
opinions.                
 
2. The Seventh Circuit’s Emphasis on the Context of Jewel’s Ad 
Underscores the Practical Necessity of a Flexible Application 
of the Commercial Speech Doctrine 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s broad application of the commercial speech 
doctrine allowed the court to analyze both the purposes and context 
behind Jewel’s ad. The court’s ability to evaluate the ad’s entire 
context and purposes to reach its decision only further illustrates why 
the Seventh Circuit’s broad application of the commercial speech 
doctrine is the best path forward in private-law cases.  
The Seventh Circuit’s broad application of the commercial speech 
doctrine is the most effective application of the commercial speech 
doctrine in private-law cases because of the prevalence of modern 
image advertising. The Seventh Circuit noted that if it focused solely 
on the literal meaning of the ad’s text it would have found the ad to be 
noncommercial speech.341 The court reasoned that modern advertising 
could still communicate strong commercial messages even though the 
messages were “general and implicit, rather than specific and 
explicit.”342 Thus, the court correctly determined that it needed to 
consider the ad’s entire context rather than focus solely on the plain 
meaning of the text in the ad in order to properly evaluate whether 
Jewel’s ad constituted commercial speech.343   
Upon consideration of the ad’s context, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that Jewel’s ad served the dual functions of 
                                                                                                                   
transaction and thus may not meet a core definition of commercial speech, the 
Supreme Court has extended the category to include speech similar to the article.”). 
341 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 517. 
342 Id. at 517-518. 
343 Id.  
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“congratulating Jordan” and “promoting Jewel’s supermarkets.”344 
Jewel argued that its ad was a tribute to Jordan, and the ad was similar 
to its practice of commending local community groups for their 
achievements.345 However, the Seventh Circuit evaluated Jewel’s ad in 
context by acknowledging the important differences that exist between 
congratulating a local community group and congratulating a world-
famous athlete.346  
Specifically, the court noted that unlike community groups, 
famous athletes do not need the extra notoriety that stems from an 
unsolicited use of their identities.347 The court also noted that famous 
athletes’ identities have commercial value, whereas community groups 
do not.348 Further, the court recognized that Jewel’s ad’s 
congratulatory message incorporated Jordan into Jewel’s trademarked 
slogan, describing “Jordan as a fellow Chicagoan who was just around 
the corner for so many years.”349 Thus, the court determined that 
Jewel’s congratulatory message to Jordan could not be considered the 
primary purpose of Jewel’s ad because Jewel’s linkage of Jordan to its 
slogan only made sense if Jewel’s goal was to associate Jordan with 
Jewel’s brand.350 The court ultimately held that although Jewel’s 
commercial message was implicit, it was easy to infer that Jewel’s 
promotion of its brand was the ad’s “dominant” purpose.351 Thus, 
Jewel’s ad constituted commercial speech.352  
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s flexible application of the 
commercial speech doctrine allowed the court to evaluate the context 
and purposes behind Jewel’s design of its ad. The court noted that 
                                                 
344 Id. at 518. 






350 Id. at 519. 
351 Id. at 518. 
352 Id. at 518-519. 
50
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 10, Issue 2                        Spring 2015 
 
436 
Jewel’s logo was displayed in the largest font size on the page.353 The 
court also noted that Jewel’s ad displayed its logo in the exact center 
of the page, and that Jewel’s logo and slogan were styled in their 
“trademarked ways.”354 Thus, the court reasoned that Jewel’s logo and 
slogan’s “style, size, and color” set them apart from the ad’s 
celebratory text and drew the reader’s attention to Jewel as the sponsor 
of the tribute.355 The Seventh Circuit determined that in the context of 
all these factors that the ad’s dominant purpose was not to celebrate 
Jordan’s legacy, but was instead for the primary purpose of fostering 
“goodwill for the Jewel brand” in the hopes of “increasing patronage 
at Jewel-Osco stores.”356  
In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s broad application of the commercial 
speech doctrine was proper here because it allowed the court to 
consider Jewel’s ad in context, and thus discover the dominant 
purposes of Jewel’s ad.  If this court were to apply the commercial 
speech doctrine rigidly, the court would have concluded that Jewel’s 
ad deserved full First Amendment protection simply because the ad 
did not directly propose a commercial transaction. A flexible 
application of the commercial speech doctrine allowed the court to 
avoid this problem and correctly hold that advertisements promoting 
brand loyalty are just as “commercial” as advertisements directly 
“proposing a commercial transaction” for a specific product.357  
As the Seventh Circuit recognized, a rigid application of the 
commercial speech doctrine would essentially create a constitutional 
“distinction between product advertising and image advertising” even 
though both advertising genres can display an equally clear 
commercial message.358 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit’s ability to 
analyze the entire context and purposes of Jewel’s ad provides strong 
support for the proposition that a broad application of the commercial 
                                                 
353 Id. at 518. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 518-519. 
357 Id. at 519. 
358 Id. at 518-520. 
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speech doctrine provides the most practical path forward in private-
law cases.   
 
B. The Seventh Circuit Properly Applied the Bolger Framework 
to Confirm that Jewel’s Advertisement Constituted Commercial 
Speech 
 
In its Bolger analysis, the Seventh Circuit correctly asked whether 
the speech: (1) was an advertisement, (2) referred to a specific product 
or service, and (3) had economic motive.359 First, the Seventh Circuit 
properly noted that its application of the Bolger framework “confirms” 
its conclusion that Jewel’s ad is commercial speech.360 Commercial 
speech is defined as speech that proposes a commercial transaction. 
Thus, the Bolger framework serves as a method to determine whether 
an expression essentially proposes a commercial transaction and 
therefore, constitutes commercial speech.361 Thus, it is doctrinally 
impossible to hold that an expression proposes a commercial 
transaction but does not constitute commercial speech under the 
Bolger framework. The Seventh Circuit’s recognition of this principle 
further demonstrates its proper understanding of the commercial 
speech doctrine’s application.  
With regard to Bolger’s first factor, the Seventh Circuit properly 
concluded that Jewel’s ad qualified “as an advertisement in form.”362 
The court noted that Jewel’s ad clearly promoted Jewel’s brand to the 
readers, and Jewel’s ad could easily be distinguished from the 
magazine’s “editorial content” because the ad was not an “article,” 
“column,” or “news photograph.”363 Further, the court acknowledged 
that Jewel’s own copywriter admitted that the ad was “too selly 
[sic].”364 Given the context behind Jewel’s ad, the court correctly 
                                                 
359 Id. at 519. 
360 Id. 
361 See Am. Future Sys., Inc., v. Pa. State Univ., 752 F.2d 854, 862 (1984). 
362 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 519. 
363 Id. 
364 Id.  
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determined these facts alone were enough to classify Jewel’s ad as an 
advertisement. 
However, several other facts relevant to Bolger’s first factor 
solidify the Seventh Circuit’s determination that Jewel’s ad qualified 
as an advertisement. For instance the court could have reasoned, like 
the Third Circuit reasoned in Facenda, that the ad’s all-positive tone 
weighed in favor of finding Jewel’s ad constituted an advertisement.365 
Similarly, the court could have determined, like the Second Circuit 
determined in Bad Frog, that Jewel’s use of its trademarked logo 
communicated enough commercial information to find that Jewel’s ad 
constituted an advertisement.366 Accordingly, it is clear that the 
Seventh Circuit properly found that Jewel’s ad qualified as an 
advertisement under the Bolger framework. 
Moving to Bolger’s second factor, the Seventh Circuit conceded 
that Jewel’s ad did not offer a specific product.367 However, the court 
noted that the failure to reference a product “is far from dispositive” in 
image advertising cases because as the court previously noted, brand 
advertising can be just as commercial in nature as product 
advertising.368 Because of this reality, the court properly attributed less 
weight to Bolger’s second factor in this case. 369    
Lastly, given that the Seventh Circuit had already determined that 
the ad’s primary purpose was to promote Jewel’s brand and increase 
sales, the court held that there was “no question” that Jewel had an 
economic motive for its celebratory tribute to Jordan.370 The court also 
found important that Jewel’s marketing representatives stated that it 
would “be good for [Jewel]” to place its logo in Sports Illustrated 
                                                 
365 See Facenda v. National Football League Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1017-
18 (2008). 
366 See Bad Frog Brewery v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96-97 
(1998). 
367 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 519-520. 
368 Id. at 519. 
369 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 n.14 (1983) 
(“[W]e express no opinion as to whether reference to any particular product is a 
necessary element of commercial speech.”). 
370 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 520. 
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simply because more people would be exposed to the logo.371 As a 
result, the court held that these facts demonstrate that “Jewel had 
something to gain” by running its ad at the exact moment of Jordan’s 
hall of fame induction.372 
Moreover, because the Seventh Circuit determined that the ad’s 
dominant purpose was to enhance the Jewel brand, the court properly 
afforded greater weight to Bolger’s third factor. In some cases, the 
Supreme Court states that merely because a speaker could potentially 
profit from his speech does not by itself make the speech 
commercial.373 However, in those cases the Supreme Court makes that 
point under the premise that the opportunity to profit from the speech 
is a secondary motivation of the speech.374 Thus, the Seventh Circuit 
appropriately afforded greater weight to Jewel’s economic motivation 
for its ad in this case because Jewel’s economic motivation was the 
primary reason for congratulating Jordan in its ad.                
In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s in context consideration of Jewel’s 
ad allowed the court to attribute the proper weight to each individual 
Bolger factor. The court properly attributed greater weight to Jewel’s 
economic motivation, because it was the dominant purpose for Jewel’s 
ad. Likewise, the court properly afforded less weight to Bolger’s 
second factor in order to avoid creating a constitutional distinction 
between different forms of commercial advertising. Thus, the court 
correctly held that the ad’s lack of reference to a particular product did 
not outweigh Jewel’s ad’s substantial satisfaction of Bolger’s first and 





                                                 
371 Id. 
372 Id. 
373 See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n 
of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1988). 
374 Id. 
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C. The Seventh Circuit Properly Applied the Inextricably 
Intertwined Exception  
 
Before concluding its analysis, the Seventh Circuit examined the 
district court’s finding that the ad’s commercial and noncommercial 
elements were “inextricably intertwined.”375 In the district court 
opinion, Judge Fienerman conducted a superficial analysis of the 
exception lasting all of one paragraph.376 Further, the District Court’s 
opinion was brief to the point that it failed to cite Fox—the Supreme 
Court’s seminal case on the inextricably intertwined doctrine.377  
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit addressed the application of 
inextricably intertwined exception by first reviewing how it was 
applied in Fox.378 Upon this thorough review, the court determined 
that the inextricably intertwined exception “applies only when it is 
legally or practically impossible for the speaker” to separate the 
speech’s commercial elements from its noncommercial elements.379 
Contrary to the District Court’s loose application of the “inextricably 
intertwined” exception, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the 
exception only applies in highly specific circumstances. The Seventh 
Circuit’s strict interpretation of the inextricably intertwined exception, 
rather than the District Court’s loose interpretation, is a more accurate 
representation of the Fox rule because the Fox Court specifically held 
that the exception only applies when the speaker is “required” to 
combine the noncommercial elements with the commercial elements 
in a single expression.380  
Here, the Seventh Circuit correctly determined that the ad’s two 
messages, promoting its brand and paying tribute to Jordan, were not 
“inextricably intertwined” because “no law of man or nature 
                                                 
375 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 520-521. 
376 Jordan, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. 
377 Id. 
378 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 521. 
379 Id. at 521. 
380 Bd. of Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989). 
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compelled Jewel” to combine these messages into one expression.381 
In other words, Jewel was capable of saluting Jordan’s 
accomplishments without simultaneously promoting its own brand. No 
law of man or nature forced Jewel to do both at the same time. Thus, 
the Seventh Circuit properly applied the “inextricably intertwined” 




The U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to provide a uniform 
application of the commercial speech doctrine has left courts free to 
apply the doctrine as flexibly or rigidly as they see fit. The district 
court and Seventh Circuit’s directly opposing outcomes in Jordan 
illustrate this result. Other courts’ attempts to resolve this doctrinal 
struggle have resulted in divergent, and often irreconcilable, 
commercial speech interpretations.  
However, in this case the Seventh Circuit engaged in a flexible 
commercial speech analysis and evaluated the expression’s entire 
context before making its decision. This allowed the Seventh Circuit 
to expand the scope of commercial speech beyond expression that 
directly proposes a commercial transaction. This flexible application 
of the commercial speech doctrine is the most practical commercial 
speech interpretation because it provides a path for courts to hold that 
clearly commercial expressions qualify as commercial speech even 
though they do not directly reference a specific product. Thus, if and 
when the U.S. Supreme Court decides to formulate a uniform 
commercial speech analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court should follow 
the path laid out by the Seventh Circuit because it provides the most 
pragmatic and effective interpretation of the commercial speech 
doctrine. 
                                                 
381 Jordan, 743 F.3d at 522. 
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